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Abstract
It is well established in the literature that foreign aliates are subject to a series of governance
and assimilation costs that deteriorate their performance. This is particularly relevant for rms which
have been recently acquired by foreign investors. We employ the variation in civic capital across Italian
provinces as an exogenous determinant of these governance costs. We derive the testable implication
that there should be a clean evidence of a negative eect of foreign ownership on performance in areas
where civic capital is low. As the level of local civic capital increases, this reduces the scope for internal
transaction costs, and makes the governance of foreign aliates easier, and their performance better.
We take this prediction to the data and nd conrmation of our conceptual framework. Our analysis
underlines the importance of the geographic heterogeneity of informal institutions when analyzing the
eect of foreign ownership on rm performance.
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1 Introduction
The question of whether aliates of multinational companies outperform purely domestic rms has attracted
huge attention. The internalization literature (Dunning, 1981; Caves, 1996) stresses that multinational rms
possess sophisticated assets which domestic rms lack, including managerial expertise, process and produc-
tion technologies or brand names. Since these assets are transferred to the foreign aliates, it is quite
obvious to expect that foreign rms should perform better than their domestic competitors. On the other
hand, there exists a well-developed management literature (Tomassen & Benito, 2009; Buckley & Strange,
2011; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011) which stresses the role of assimilation and governance costs that multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) incur when they operate a subsidiary in a foreign country. According to this
literature, these internal transaction costs are a serious obstacle for the well-functioning of foreign aliates.
The nal performance of foreign aliates can be seen as the outcome of these two contrasting forces.
The rst postulates an advantage of foreign rms with respect to domestic competitors coming from the
assets internalized within the network of the MNE, while the second posits a disadvantage due to the
higher exposure to governance and assimilation costs. Despite a large number of studies, the empirical
literature has failed to reach a consensus on whether foreign rms do perform better than domestic ones.
Especially more recent papers have cast doubts on the view that foreign ownership improves performance,
in the year of the foreign acquisition or up to few years later. Papers like Harris & Robinson (2002),
Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006), Salis (2008) show that, in general, there is not any signicant increase in
terms of performance induced by a foreign acquisition.
In this paper, we introduce a new dimension into this discussion. In particular, we allow for geographic
heterogeneity in the eect of foreign ownership on performance: employing Italian rm level data, we show
that there is a strong evidence of a negative eect of foreign ownership on rm performance in local areas
where the stock of civic capital is low. On the contrary, as the stock of civic capital increases, so does the
performance of foreign aliates. The economic intuition behind this result is that, by reducing the scope
of opportunistic behavior, civic capital alleviates agency problems and enhances cooperation in intra-rm
interactions. Hence, we expect that where civic capital is low the disadvantages of foreign ownership in the
form of governance and assimilation costs outperform the advantages. As civic capital goes up, governing
and assimilating foreign rms become easier, something which, ultimately, improves their performance.
Our estimation strategy rests on a two stage approach. In the rst stage we estimate total factor
productivity by the semi-parametric approach proposed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003). In the second stage,
we employ a dierence-in-dierence approach where the change in rm productivity is regressed, among
others, on our variable of interest, namely the interaction between a dummy identifying the change in
foreign ownership status and the stock of local civic capital. By estimating the regression in rst dierences
we explicitly take unobserved heterogeneity at the rm level into account. In addition, the dierence-
in-dierences approach entails that econometric identication is based on the subset of rms switching
ownership status, while the rest of rms who do not change their status form the baseline group. We also
allow for industry, province, and time specic trends.
Focusing on Italy is particularly convenient for our exercise, as the intense investigation of civic capital
in this country (Baneld, 1958; Putnam et al., 1993; Guiso et al., 2004) has produced a range of indirect
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measures of civic capital. Specically, as in Guiso et al. (2004), we proxy civic capital by electoral turnout
in referenda, the number of blood donations, and the number of volunteers in non-prot organizations per
province. In order to minimize problems of measurement error, we also extract the rst principal component
out of these three measures.
Our ndings complement the existing literature along several lines. First, we extend the branch of studies
which has looked at performance dierentials between domestic rms and foreign aliates. This question
has been analyzed with data from dierent countries, including the U.K. (Grith, 1999; Conyon et al.,
2002; Harris & Robinson, 2002), Italy (Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2006), Germany (Temouri et al., 2008) ,
Slovenia (Salis, 2008), and Indonesia (Arnold & Javorcik, 2009). Each of these studies implicitly assumes
that the governance costs that foreign aliates face do not vary geographically. In contrast, our study
underlines the importance of local informal institutions, in particular the stock of civic capital, and shows
that an adverse eect of foreign acquisitions on performance can be found in some selected areas only.
Second, the international business literature recently has stressed the role of governance costs in de-
termining the performance of foreign rms. Analyzing the performance of foreign subsidiaries owned by
Norwegian multinationals, Tomassen & Benito (2009) nd that governance costs (which are, according to
their denition, costs related to bargaining, monitoring and maladaptation) signicantly reduce the perfor-
mance. Their paper diers from ours because they use a questionnaire from 160 foreign aliates belonging
to Norwegian parent companies, and because the basic variables are multi-item variables based on a qual-
itative assessment by the respondent.1 Moreover, dierently from them, we stress the role of the \civic
environment" in which the aliate is embedded for the determination of its governance costs and, ulti-
mately, performance. In other terms, we do not measure directly each aliate's governance costs, but
we provide evidence that (through civic capital) an attitude towards greater information sharing, more
cooperative behavior, and easier conict resolution improves aliates performance.
Two general caveats can be made regarding our analysis. The rst point regards the mode of entry
of the MNE. Foreign rms have the option of entering a foreign market through a greeneld investment,
when a new production plant is built, or through a browneld one, when a certain amount of equities of
an existing plant is acquired.2 This paper and much of the literature on the impact of foreign ownership
are focused on the case of browneld acquisitions, since in this case it is easier to identify the direct eect
of the ownership change on rms performance. The second important point to keep in mind is that the
literature on foreign rms performance often looks at the impact of the ownership change in the short run.
Some papers (Conyon et al., 2002; Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2006) analyze the eect of foreign ownership on
productivity in the same year the change in ownership status takes place. Other papers (Harris & Robinson,
2002; Salis, 2008) follow the rm up to few years after the acquisition. In this respect, our paper is not
an exception, because, as it will be discussed below, we look at productivity changes over a three-year
period of time. Consequently, we agree with Harris & Robinson (2003) that over a longer time horizon the
performance of foreign rms may be signicantly better than that of domestic rms, because it may take
time to fully exploit the advantages of foreign ownership.
1See Tomassen & Benito (2009) for more information.
2The usual convention is to identify a foreign direct investment when foreign persons come to hold at least 10% of the share
of equities.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we rst review the literature about the
performance of foreign rms, and then outline the mechanism by which civic capital impacts on this.
Section 3 presents the data, section 4 the methodological approach, section 5 the results, while section 6
discusses the robustness of the analysis. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Civic capital and the performance of foreign rms: assessing
the link
2.1 The impact of foreign ownership on performance
Several studies have addressed the issue relative to the productivity dierence between foreign and domestic
rms.3 The main theoretical underpinning lies in the so-called internalization theory (Dunning, 1981; Caves,
1996), according to which foreign aliates established in host countries receive superior intangible assets
coming from the parent company, usually in the form of technological and managerial know-how, and brand
names. This leads to a signicant rise in the productivity of the receiving rms, besides allowing the MNE
to expand production abroad avoiding the market transaction costs implied by the transfer of the goods
through trade or other arrangements such as franchising or international joint ventures. Nevertheless, this
expected raise in productivity is not automatic as subsidiaries may also incur in productivity losses. This
may depend on a series of issues.
In their review of the literature, Harris & Robinson (2003) mention several reasons why foreign rms may
actually experience a decline in performance, particularly in the immediate post- acquisition period. First,
due to cultural dierences between home and host countries, the process of incorporation and assimilation of
acquired plants into the MNE structure may result problematic, and it may be particularly dicult to reach
from the beginning a high level of eciency.4 The change in ownership due to the foreign acquisition may
actually exacerbate governance and organizational problems (e.g., failures in coordination and monitoring)
that are quite common in business enterprises. Tomassen & Benito (2009) use data from a survey of 160
Norwegian MNEs. They nd a performance decline in foreign subsidiaries and indicate that nearly 40% of
their variability in terms of performance can be attributed to governance costs.
Second, a lower level of productivity may be caused by the dierent types of activity that are carried
out in the foreign owned plant. As a matter of fact, parent rms may be willing to keep close to the
headquarters high valued added operations, while letting the delocalization in the host country of low value
added operations, such as assembly. This could potentially decrease productivity in aliates abroad due to
the increase in the use of low-skilled labor and low-end technologies.
Another reason for the absence of a sizeable increase in the performance of foreign rms is the one
3The literature on this topic is really vast. We have been selective and review here only the research work that we judge to
be more closely related to our research.
4See on this issue Dunning (1998) too. There is also a large literature on the role of cultural distance in M&A, but we do
not review it here. Moreover, since our paper is focused on a developed country like Italy, we think it is of little interest a
comparison of our paper with Arnold & Javorcik (2009), who analyze data pertaining to a developing country like Indonesia.
The authors nd that foreign ownership leads to productivity improvements being particularly visible after three years of the
acquisition.
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proposed by Salis (2008). He nds that acquired Slovenian rms in 1997 and in the two subsequent years
do not overcome in terms of productivity their domestic counterparts. He motivates his nding of a non-
signicant eect of foreign ownership hanging on the fact that the acquisition carried out by the investing
rm may be characterized by an asset seeking motivation: in this situation, MNEs make a foreign direct
investment (FDI) with the purpose of having access to technological or other assets held by the acquired
rm. For this reason, it is possible that the rm receiving the FDI has nothing to benet from the change
in ownership, since it enjoys the same (or even greater) productivity level of the parent company.
Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of foreign ownership on rm performance. This huge
academic interest notwithstanding, empirical evidence remains mixed. Conyon et al. (2002) document for
the U.K. an increase in the level and growth of labor productivity when a foreign acquisition takes place.
This result contrasts sharply with Harris & Robinson (2002), still for the case of the U.K. They nd that
rm performance, after a domestic or foreign acquisition, may actually deteriorate. Consistently with this
picture, Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006) get a negative point estimate for the eect of foreign ownership
on productivity in Italy, although the parameter is statistically dierent from zero at the 10% level in one
specication only, while in the rest of the specications it is not statistically dierent from zero.5
Out of the main reasons that may explain the short run performance of foreign rms, we focus con-
ceptually on the role of governance and organizational diculties that arise when rms are foreign owned.
These problems are ubiquitous to every business organization, but become particulary severe when a rm
is assimilated in the network of an MNE. We see the foreign rm performance score to be determined by
the balance between the advantages of being part of the MNE network, as postulated by the internalization
theory, and the disadvantages, as postulated by the governance and internal transaction costs theory. The
novel point that our paper makes is to show that this process may be facilitated or hindered by the level of
civic capital of the local area where the rm is located. We now turn to developing this argument properly.
2.2 Foreign rms, governance costs and civic capital
The internalization theory of FDI posits that MNEs opt to expand abroad through foreign acquisitions
whenever market agreements with foreign producers are too costly or too risky.6 However, in doing so,
MNEs incur another type of transaction costs, this time specic to the relationship between the parent
company and the foreign aliate. The business literature has stressed the role of three interrelated de-
terminants of transaction costs within large organizations in general, and multinational rms in particular
(Buckley & Carter, 1996; Buckley & Casson, 1998; Buckley & Strange, 2011). The rst concerns informa-
tion and knowledge. The relevant information for decision making is distributed among individuals within
a rm. Firm organization has to be designed in such a way as to facilitate a smooth ow of information
and knowledge among its members both within and across hierarchies. Second, the tasks required for pro-
duction have to be eciently coordinated. This requires identication of complementarity of action and
5A positive signicant eect is found when they account for the nationality of the foreign investor. In the case of rms
which become owned by a U.S. company, a surge in productivity is associated to the ownership change.
6For example, imperfect property rights protection in the foreign country could lead to prots' loss due to the imitation
of the products. In addition, market relationships between the MNE and foreign producers may suer from a wide range of
imperfections due to contractual incompleteness.
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the corresponding coordination of the production process. Third, rm members often pursue personal goals
which are not necessarily congruent with those of the rm as a whole. Therefore, a motivational scheme
is necessary which ensures that agents take actions which are consistent with the objective function of the
rm.
Importantly, the incidence of internal transaction costs is substantially higher in the case of multinational
rms as compared to domestically owned rms. The increase stems from two interrelated sets of factors
which aect each of the above mentioned areas. First, operation in dierent countries implies substantial
spatial separation of production facilities. This requires a smooth ow of information and makes an ecient
coordination of the various production tasks more cumbersome. Moreover, asymmetric information between
local managers and foreign shareholders as well as the diculty to eectively monitor distant agents exac-
erbate agency problems (Buckley & Casson, 1998). The second set of factors are cultural dierences among
countries. This increases and further complicates the ow of information and knowledge among foreign
aliates and the mother company (Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993; Buckley & Carter, 2002).
Civic capital, on the other hand, has important bearings on the incidence of intra-rm governance costs.
Relying on Guiso et al. (2010), we dene it as \those persistent values and beliefs that help a group overcome
the free-rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities".7 The important characteristic that civic
capital entails is the property of hampering narrow-minded self-interested behavior in collective endeavors.
Reducing the scope of opportunistic behavior, in turn, is associated with a reduction in shirking in intra-rm
relationships which reduces governance costs of intra-rm transactions through at least two channels. First,
reduced shirking removes agency problems and mitigates dilemmas of collective action at the root. Second,
the increased cooperative behavior of agents that is associated with a high stock of civic capital improves
the ow of information and the coordination of tasks.
As outlined above, the spatial separation of production and the related lack of information about local
conditions makes multinational rms more vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation in contractual relation-
ships than domestically owned rms.
Consequently, the main testable hypothesis of our framework is that assimilation problems and the
associated governance costs should be stronger where civic capital is low, and this implies that there should
be a clean evidence of a (short run) negative eect of foreign ownership on performance in areas where civic
capital is low. As the level of local civic capital increases, this reduces the scope for information, coordination,
and monitoring hazards, and makes the governance of foreign aliates easier, and their performance better.8
Let us now describe the data set and the empirical strategy employed to test this hypothesis.
7See Guiso et al. (2010) on p. 7.
8It is important to stress that we deviate from some of the business literature in an important dimension. Several studies
have shown that cooperation among rm members is determined by rm policies (Spagnolo, 1999; Rob & Zemsky, 2002). We
abandon this assumption in that the cooperative attitude in a rm is exclusively determined by the stock of civic capital in
the area where the rm is located. This assumption is backed by empirical evidence. Analyzing a data set from a large Italian
bank, Ichino & Maggi (2000) show that the cooperative behavior of workers is to a large extent determined by individual
background. Similarly, Weber et al. (1996) nd that national and corporate culture are strongly correlated.
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3 Data description
3.1 The UniCredit Survey
We work with the 7th (1995-1997), 8th (1998-2000), and 9th (2001-2003) wave of \Indagine sulle imprese
manifatturiere" (the Survey of manufacturing rms). This survey was carried out by Mediocredito Centrale,
now a part of UniCredit Group, one of the largest Italian banks.9 Each wave covers three years. Overall,
the period that we consider ranges from 1995 until 2003. The data set encompasses the universe of Italian
manufacturing rms with more than 500 employees, as well as a stratied and rotating sample of smaller
rms. Half of the rms are replaced by new rms in subsequent waves. The choice of the rms to be
dropped is random and tries to maintain the structure of stratication. The minimum size of rms in the
three waves are 10 employees. In the survey, rms are asked to provide detailed information about their
ownership structure, labor force, R&D activity, internationalization and nance. The information from
the survey is then combined with yearly balance sheet data from AIDA, enabling us to work with a rich
rm-level data set.10
In the survey, rms are asked to report their ownership structure just once in each wave, with reference
to the last year of the wave. For this reason, in the nal sample we keep only observations from the years
1997, 2000, and 2003 (the last years of each wave) so that the full set of information is available. Moreover,
in order to allow the implementation of panel techniques with an adequate number of observations, we keep
only rms which are surveyed in two consecutive waves at least. Concerning the denition of a foreign
aliate, we stick to the standard denition whereby a rm is classied as foreign owned if at least 10%
of the equities is held by one or more foreign persons. Consequently, rms can experience the following
two changes in ownership status over time: they can start being foreign owned when the equities held by
foreigners reach at least the 10% threshold (we call this a start event); they can stop being foreign owned,
thus becoming domestically owned, when the amount of equities held by foreigners goes below the 10%
threshold (we call this a stop event). Given that rms are surveyed for a maximum of three waves, some
of them may experience multiple changes in the foreign ownership status (from domestic to foreign and
then back to domestic or, viceversa, from foreign to domestic and then again to foreign).11 Some rms are
always domestic over the observed lapse of time, while others are always foreign. In the part devoted to
the description of the empirical strategy we will explain why it is advisable to rely exclusively on rms who
change ownership status (rms who are hit by at least one start or stop event over time) to identify the
impact of foreign ownership according to local civic capital.
After removing outliers we end up with an unbalanced panel of approximately 1600 rms.12 Calculating
rst dierences gives 1989 observations. As to the events that characterize the change in ownership status,
we have 74 start events, and 41 stop events. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for some rm-level
9The quality and reliability of the data set are documented by the fact that papers employing this survey have already been
published in peer-reviewed journals (see, for example, Angelini & Generale, 2008; Benfratello et al., 2008; Casaburi & Minerva,
2011).
10See Appendix 8.1 for a detailed description of the rm-level variables employed in our analysis and, in particular, for a
description of the question related to the ownership structure.
11Actually, among the rms who undergo multiple foreign ownership changes, there are only start-stop rms. No rm with
a stop-start pattern is present.
12The trimming procedure that we adopt is explained in Appendix 8.1.
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performance measures before and after the changes in ownership.
[Table 1 about here]
The table shows that both changes in ownership structure are associated with a decrease in performance
over a three-year period. For example, if a rm starts to be a foreign aliate during a certain wave, value
added per worker goes down by 41% on average in the last year of the wave where the change occurred with
respect to three years before (since the performance variables are measured in logarithms, their dierence is
a growth rate).13 The capital stock shrinks by almost 27%, while Total Factor Productivity (TFP hereafter)
goes down by 37%.14 In the case of a start event, the only measure which seems not to be negatively aected
by the change in ownership is the number of workers, which increases by 5%. Turning to the stop events,
they show the same negative pattern (in this case also size is negatively aected), although the decrease is
smaller in magnitude.
In the last two columns we report descriptive statistics for the rms which are always domestic or foreign
owned over the entire period. The table conrms the well known result that foreign rms outperform their
domestic counterparts in terms of size and productivity.15 The comparison of the performance of rms
changing ownership status (either due to a start or to a stop event) with rms which do not change status
(always domestic or always foreign) unveils interesting results. The rms which start being foreign owned
are characterized by an extremely high level of productivity (either in terms of value added per worker or in
terms of TFP) before the start event takes place. This means that the target of foreign acquisitions are rms
being highly ecient. This result is not new in the literature and goes under the heading of operational
eciency theory (see Harris & Robinson, 2002, and references therein). Also not new is the fact that, even
if better rms are bought by foreign persons, there may be problems of governance and assimilation which
induce the post-acquisition performance of starting rms to be poor. In the immediate post-acquisition
period rms in our data set experience a decline in productivity of roughly 40%.
3.2 Measurement of civic capital
As mentioned earlier, we measure the stock of civic capital in a given province by average electoral turnout
in referenda held between 1946 and 1987, the number of blood donations (per 1000 inhabitants), and the
number of volunteers in non prot organizations (standardized again by 100,000 inhabitants). The choice of
the proxies for civic capital is governed by the following reasoning. First, all activities are associated with a
personal cost which often exceeds the mere opportunity cost of time devoted to these activities.16 Second,
13Remember that information about ownership is provided for the last year of each wave. Let us consider an example to
clarify the data structure. If a rm is classied as foreign owned in 2000, but was not so in 1997, we call this a start event.
Clearly, we do not know whether the actual change has taken place in 1998, 1999 or 2000 itself. However, looking at the
variation of one of the performance measures in 2000 with respect to 1997, we are sure that we are picking a point in time
before the change in ownership (1997), and a point in time after the change or contemporaneous to it (2000).
14We will explain how to measure TFP below.
15Note that the two changes in ownership status (start and stop) dier in terms of the moment at which rms are foreign
owned. While starters are foreign owned after the start event takes place, stoppers are foreign owned before the stop event.
However, this has little impact in terms of the comparison of performance with purely domestic enterprises. Both starters and
stoppers outperform domestic rms in terms of performance.
16For example, donating blood imposes some physical limitation for few hours after the donation, voting requires information
gathering and evaluation of the dierent alternatives.
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there are neither nancial nor legal incentives to pursue these activities. Hence, the reason why individuals
vote, donate blood or engage as volunteers is that they have internalized some common good for which they
are disposed to incur costs, without receiving any material compensation. In section 2, we have outlined
that the stock of civic capital consists exactly of these behavioral traits.
As each of our proxies of civic capital is supposed to be measured with error, we also extract the rst
principal component out of the three direct measures.17 In this manner we get a regressor who captures the
common component of the three proxies, net of the idiosyncratic factors which induce a certain participation
pattern in some variables and not in others. The following table shows the correlation coecient between
the proxies and the resulting rst principal component.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As expected, we have a strong positive relationship between each of our three proxies. However, the
fact that the correlation is far from being perfect implies that the proxies are blurred by idiosyncratic
factors. The relationship between the rst principal component and each of the three proxies is roughly
equally strong which means that there is a strong common pattern. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the geographic
distribution of electoral turnout, blood donation, and volunteering, respectively. All three maps reveal that
civic capital is higher in the Central and Northern part of the country. Figure 4 shows the geographic
distribution across Italian provinces of the measure of civic capital based on the rst principal component.
As before, we nd that civic capital is the highest in regions in the Center-North, like Emilia-Romagna, and
the lowest in the Southern mainland and Sicily.
[Insert Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 about here]
In Table 3 we provide the full set of descriptive statistics for our data.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
4 Empirical strategy
In order to identify the impact of civic capital on rm performance according to the changes in rms'
ownership, we fall back on a two-step procedure.18 Our main performance measure is TFP.19 In the rst
step, TFP is estimated by the semi-parametric approach proposed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003). The
advantage of this methodology is that it takes the potential endogeneity of the input factors into account.
In particular, the choice of input quantities might be the outcome of rm productivity. More specically,
TFP is obtained by estimating separate production functions for each 2-digit NACE sector.20 The generic
production function in industry s is
yijst = 
s
1kit + 
s
2skit + 
s
3unskit + !ijst; (1)
17In Appendix 8.2 we review how to compute the rst principal component.
18This strategy is quite common in the literature. See for example Javorcik (2004) in the case of spillovers from FDI or
Lopez (2009) in the case of exporters.
19In the robustness checks we replace it with value added per worker.
20In order to increase precision we use the entire sample for TFP estimation and not just those rms which are sampled for
two consecutive waves at least.
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where yijst labels the log of value added of rm i in province j in industry s at time t. Only in the case
of TFP estimation, we employ yearly observations for nine distinct points in time, which correspond to the
years from 1995 to 2003.21 The logarithm of capital stock and the logarithm of the number of skilled and
unskilled workers of the rm are denominated kit, skit, and unskit, respectively. The logarithm of TFP is
represented by !ijst and computed for each rm in the industry in each period of time.
In the second step, we regress the log of TFP on our variables of interest. Our estimation strategy is
based on a dierence-in-dierences approach. We start from the following linear equation governing log
TFP at the rm level:
!ijst = 0 + 1FOit + 2(FOit  CCj) + 3(FOit  lnPopj) + t + j + s + jt+ st+ i + ijst: (2)
In this case, we employ three points in time, t = f0; 1; 2g, which correspond to the years 1997, 2000,
and 2003: it is only for these years (the nal years of each wave) that the complete set of information is
available. In equation (2), foreign ownership of rm i is denominated by FOit, a dummy which equals
1 if rm i is foreign owned at time t (a rm is foreign owned when the equity share held by foreigners
reaches the 10% threshold). Civic capital in province j where rm i is located is labelled CCj . In order to
capture the dierential impact of civic capital on rm performance, we add as a regressor the interaction
of foreign ownership and civic capital, FOit  CCj . We also add the interaction of foreign ownership with
the log of population in a given province, labelled lnPopj , to control for the heterogeneity of the eect of
FO in provinces with dierent local market size.22 The parameter 1 tells us what would be the impact
of foreign ownership on productivity in provinces where the level of civic capital and the log of population
were zero (there are no such provinces in our data set). The parameter 2 indicates how foreign ownership
aects productivity as civic capital increases. The parameter 3 indicates how foreign ownership aects
productivity as provincial population goes up. Lastly, we introduce the following array of terms: j and
s capture all those time-constant features at the provincial and industry level which inuence rm-level
productivity; t is a time eect on productivity; jt and st are time trends in the eects at the provincial
and industry level; i captures all remaining unobserved productivity heterogeneity at the rm level; nally,
ijst is the residual error term. We assume that the error term follows a AR(1) process, ijst = ijst 1+ijst,
with  close to one and ijst being a white noise.
23 We think that this assumption is well-suited to capture
the behavior of productivity at the rm level.
The holding of at least 10% of shares by foreign investors (i.e., the FO dummy variable) is by no means
randomly assigned across rms. We explicitly consider dierent sources of selection bias.
A rst source of selection bias concerns the location decision of foreign rms. An extensive literature
studying the location decision of foreign rms has found that FDI is directed into areas with a favorable busi-
ness environment (Head et al., 1995; Wei et al., 1999; Basile, 2004; Du et al., 2008). In particular, foreign
investors prefer locations with well-functioning institutions, access to large markets and good infrastruc-
ture. These features may in turn have an impact on rm productivity. In our specication, these factors
are captured by j , a term which controls for province xed eects, and jt, a province specic time trend.
These characteristics of the rms' business environment, which inuence simultaneously rm performance
21Because the UniCredit Survey is rotating, not all rms are observed for the full nine-year period.
22Population is averaged over the years 1995-2003.
23AR(1) error terms in the equation for productivity have been employed in this context from Grith (1999) onward.
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and attract foreign direct investment, may bias our OLS estimates if they are not removed from the error
term, because they can induce correlation between the error term and foreign ownership.
A second source of bias is at the rm level. Several studies have proved that foreign investors acquire
those domestic rms which display an above-average productivity level (Harris & Robinson, 2002; Salis,
2008). Table 1 shows that this pattern holds true also in our sample. Moreover, the table shows that rms
receiving FDI are signicantly larger in terms of capital stock and number of employees. This superiority
may descend from rm characteristics such as managerial skills, sophisticated technologies, or brand names
which are typically non-observable. All these features are captured by the rm-specic eect, i. If during
the estimation procedure this term is not removed and goes into the error term, the OLS estimates will be
biased again.
In order to overcome the potential endogeneity of FO descending from the above mentioned sources, we
take equation (2) in rst dierences. Hence, all time constant eects at the rm level are wiped out. The
change in log TFP between the last year of each wave can then be expressed as
!ijst = 0 + 1FOit + 2FOit  CCj + 3FOit  lnPopj + t + j + s +ijst (3)
where the term t = t t 1 is a new set of time eects, while j and s are industry and province specic
eects, respectively, and derive from the time trends of equation (2).24 Equation (3) is estimated through
OLS for two time periods, t = f1; 2g, one corresponding to the productivity change between 1997 and 2000,
the other corresponding to the change between 2000 and 2003. Conditional on our set of regressors, we
assume that the correlation between the change in foreign ownership status, FOit, and the error term
ijst is zero. In this case the OLS applied to (3) are consistent. The fact that ijst follows a AR(1) process
with  close to one guarantees that ijst satises the OLS model assumptions.
25 However, correlation of
errors within the same province may descend from the fact that some key regressors (such as civic capital) are
constant at the provincial level (Moulton, 1990). For this reason we cluster standard errors at the provincial
level.26 For each time period, the reference group in equation (3) consists of rms which do not change their
ownership status; that is, those rms such that FOit = 0, either domestically or foreign owned. Notice
that from the estimation of the dierence-in-dierences model of equation (3) we retrieve the estimates of
1, 2, and 3 from equation (2), which are the parameters that link the level of a rm productivity, !ijst,
to the foreign ownership dummy, FOit. In other terms, while the econometric identication of the model
is based on the productivity change of rms which switch ownership status (from domestic to foreign, and
viceversa) having as a reference those who do not change ownership, the results of the estimates can be also
interpreted in terms of the relationship between the level of productivity and foreign ownership.27
24Adding an intercept 0 or not to our dierence-in-dierences equation is immaterial for the estimation. The only thing to
change is the interpretation of the time eects. We keep the common intercept 0 in all the specications.
25If ijst is a white noise, dierencing induces the error term ijst to follow a MA(1) process. See also footnote 26 on this
issue of potential serial correlation.
26A second type of correlation may occur within rms because, for the pairs of observations of rms sampled in both periods,
we may face serial correlation. In other words, conditional on explanatory variables, the covariance of the error term for these
rms across the two time periods is dierent from zero. This may arise if the parameter  in the AR(1) process of ijst is
well below one. Because the pairs of rm observations are nested within provinces, clustering based on the province will also
resolve this issue. See on this Cameron & Miller (2010).
27This explains why in the paper we talk interchangeably of the eect of foreign ownership on performance, having in mind
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In the context of our study it may be instructive to dierentiate according to the type of ownership change
that a rm undergoes. We have argued that the post-acquisition assimilation problems are particularly
strong in the case of a foreign investor. On the contrary, when the change in ownership is brought about by
a domestic investor, the post-acquisition performance can be thought to be less aected by the change. For
these reasons, we expect the negative variation in performance after a start event (when a foreign investor
comes in) to be larger in absolute terms than the variation after a stop event (when a domestic owner
replaces a foreign one). This conjecture is conrmed by the descriptive evidence of Table 1, where the
short-run decline in productivity (either in terms of value added per worker or in terms of TFP) is larger
in the case of a start event than in the case of a stop event. To check this more precisely in the framework
of our econometric model, for each start event at the rm level we create a dummy variable START which
equals one whenever FO = +1, and for each stop event we create a dummy variable STOP which equals
one in the case that FO =  1. We end up with the following model:
!ijst = 0 + 1STARTit + 2STARTit  CCj + 3STOPit + 4STOPit  CCj
+ 5STARTit  lnPopj + 6STOPit  lnPopj + t + j + s +ijst:
(4)
As before, for each time period, the baseline group consists of rms which do not change ownership
status. The model in equation (3) is nested in the model of equation (4). The former is obtained from the
latter if the following linear restrictions are imposed: 1 =  3, 2 =  4, and 5 =  6.
5 Results
5.1 A simple graph
In this subsection we provide some preliminary evidence through simple graphs on the relationship between
civic capital and the dierences in pre-and post acquisition performance.
Figure 5 shows the shifts in the distribution of TFP in the time period immediately before (light gray
box) and immediately after (dark gray box) the ownership change takes place, considering the transition
into and out of foreign ownership separately.28 In order to highlight the importance of civic capital, we
have split the sample into high and low civic capital provinces, according to whether the stock of civic
capital in a province is above or below the median value of its distribution. Coherently with the descriptive
evidence of Table 1, we nd that both a start and a stop event is associated with a short-run decrease in rm
performance.29 Again, the decline in performance is larger for starters than for stoppers for each subset of
the relationship between !ijst and FOit, and of the eect of the change in foreign ownership status on performance, having
in mind the relationship between !ijst and FOit.
28The following example claries the procedure. Consider a rm which is acquired by a foreign investor during the 1997-2000
period. This means that the rm is reported to be domestic in 1997 and foreign in 2000. Then, we consider the year 1997 to
be the time period immediately before the acquisition, and 2000 to be the time period immediately after it.
29The plots are read in the following way. The rectangular box depicts the interquartile range of the distribution, with the
horizontal line within the box being the median. The end of the upper (lower) whisker is the highest (lowest) adjacent value,
which is the highest (lowest) value that can be found after adding (subtracting) to the third (rst) quartile the product of
1.5 times the interquartile range. Dots beyond the adjacent values depict outliers; that is, values farther away than 1.5 times
the interquartile range. In some cases the whisker cannot be visually identied, because there are few values which are very
close one to the other. We exclude from the plot observations from rms which experience both a start and a stop event over
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provinces (high civic capital and low civic capital). This comes as no surprise, given that after a start event
foreign aliates have to operate in a new business environment, something which is associated with large
assimilation and governance costs. In the case of a stop event, the domestic investor replacing the foreign
one seems less aected, arguably because he is more experienced in running an Italian business rm, and
this decreases the post-acquisition diculties.
Comparing the decline in performance across the two subsets of provinces, we nd that it is more
pronounced in provinces where civic capital is low. This pattern is particularly evident for start events.30
The average productivity decline of this event is -0.48 in low civic capital provinces, as opposed to a
variation of only -0.09 in provinces where civic capital is high. This is in line with what we expected, given
that we believe that the cooperation-enhancing eect of civic capital helps foreign investors to overcome the
diculties associated with the change in ownership. In areas with high civic capital asymmetric information
is less likely to be opportunistically exploited in the bilateral relationships between the aliate and its
headquarters.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
5.2 Baseline regression results
To begin with, we do a simple regression where the growth rate of productivity is regressed on the foreign
ownership status change plus a set of year, province, and industry xed eects. The dierence with respect
to the model of equation (3) is that in this rst regression we omit the interaction terms.31 This exercise
aims at assessing the impact of the foreign ownership change irrespectively of the degree of civic capital of
the province where the rm is located. The estimates are presented in column (1) of Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
A negative point estimate implies that rms which become foreign owned (FO = +1) perform on
average worse than rms which do not change ownership status. This may signal an adverse eect of foreign
acquisitions on performance, but the evidence is inconclusive due to the high standard errors involved. This
is perfectly in line with the paper by Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006), where they get a negative point
estimate for the eect of foreign ownership on productivity, although the parameter is not statistically
dierent from zero in most of the specications. Also Harris & Robinson (2002)'s ndings, although rather
mixed, point to the fact that plants acquired by foreign investors may experience lower productivity after
the acquisition.32
the three-wave period. In this case there are several ways of assigning observations to the before/after start/stop categories,
and hence there are several possible plots. However, the basic insights of the gure stay the same irrespectively of the specic
assignment of these observations.
30This statement is based on median values. In high civic capital provinces, the decline in TFP is equal to -0.09 under a
start event, and -0.03 for a stop event. The corresponding values in low civic capital areas are -0.48 (start), and -0.33 (stop).
31In formal terms, the equation is
!ijst = 0 + 1FOit + t + j + s +ijst:
32In their paper, the point estimates of the post-acquisition dummies are negative in four out of six years considered in the
analysis. However, of these four negative dummies, only three of them are statistically dierent from zero.
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Summing up, foreign ownership in the short run is associated with a deterioration of the performance
in terms of productivity. The point estimate turn out to be negative, although the coecients are seldom
statistically dierent from zero. The contribution of our paper consists in shedding light on this fact. To
do so, we present regression results from our fully edged model. We experiment with dierent measures
of civic capital. In column (2), civic capital is proxied by the log of electoral turnout in referenda, in
column (3) the log of the number of blood donations is used, whereas in column (4) the log of volunteers
is employed. Finally, the last column displays the regression when civic capital is measured by the rst
principal component of the three variables. In all columns, the log of provincial population, interacted with
the change in the foreign ownership dummy (FO), controls for the eect of the size of the local market
on the productivity growth of foreign rms.
In each specication with the civic capital interaction, the coecient 1 on the variable of the change in
the foreign ownership status is negative and signicant. This means that in the (hypothetical) province in
which both the log of population and civic capital are zero, rms which become foreign owned (FO = +1)
perform on average worse than rms which do not experience a change in ownership (the control group). In
this type of province there is evidence of a strong but adverse eect of foreign ownership on productivity.
On the other hand, the positive and signicant interaction coecient of foreign ownership and civic capital
(2) implies that the eect of foreign ownership on productivity is not homogeneous across provinces.
The positive estimate for 2 means that the post-acquisition decrease in TFP is less pronounced where
the stock of civic capital is higher. In the conceptual framework we have explained this phenomenon
on the basis of the hampering of narrow-minded self-interested behavior which typically plagues internal
transactions. Provinces endowed with a high stock of civic capital provide an environment where governance
and assimilation costs faced by foreign investors are reduced. This result holds for each proxy of civic capital
and is statistically very signicant.33
We also get a highly signicant coecient for the interaction of FO and the log of population. This
means that, as the size of the local areas (in terms of population) goes up, the performance of foreign rms
improves. This may descend from some forms of agglomeration economies that are benecial to foreign
rms. This result allows to rationalize ndings such as those of Basile (2004), who documents that foreign
acquisitions in Italy are concentrated in areas where local demand is large.
5.3 Estimating separate coecients for start and stop events
We now turn to the estimation of equation (4), where we allow the eect of ownership changes to dier for
the start and the stop events respectively.
As before, we estimate the simplied version of our model, where all the interaction terms are dropped.34
The point estimates in column (1) of Table 5 indicate that, immediately after a start event, rms experience
33In order to exactly quantify the eect of foreign ownership at dierent points of the distribution of civic capital we should
perform F-tests on linear restrictions involving 1 and 2. To save on space, we do this exercise only for the model where the
eect of start and stop events is estimated separately (see below).
34The simplied model is
!ijst = 0 + 1STARTit + 3STOPit + t + j + s +ijst:
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a lower TFP, while a stop event is associated with an increase in TFP, compared to the case where no
ownership change occurs.35
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Each column from (2) to (5) in Table 5 corresponds to a dierent civic capital variable. Consider rst
the case of the switch into foreign ownership (START ). The estimates for 1 is negative. Hence, a switch
into foreign ownership brings productivity down if civic capital and population were zero. The positive
coecient of the interaction term 2 implies that the eect on productivity is higher for rms that are
located in provinces where civic capital is higher. Only when civic capital is measured by volunteering this
eect is not signicant. In the case of electoral turnout and in the case of the principal component of the
three proxy variables the interaction term is statistically signicant at the 1% level.
In order to quantify more precisely the eect of a start event on TFP growth, we evaluate its marginal
eect at dierent points of the distribution of civic capital. We consider the rst quartile, the median and
the third quartile of the distribution of civic capital in provinces that host at least one start event over the
9-year period of observation.36 Unless otherwise stated, the log of provincial population is always xed at
the sample mean (equal to 6.011). If the switch into foreign ownership takes place in a province such as
Rome, with an endowment of civic capital in terms of the principal component of -.419 (rst quartile of the
distribution of provinces with some start event), the marginal eect of the ownership change is negative,
reaching -.168. To see whether this value is statistically dierent from zero, we perform an F-test on the
linear restriction (1+ 2 :419+ 5 6:011) = 0 and nd that we can reject the null hypothesis that the
linear restriction equals zero at the 1% level; that is, the decrease in productivity growth associated with
a start event is statistically dierent from zero at the 1% level. If we plug in the linear restriction the true
value of the population of Rome we get a marginal eect equal to -.060, which is not statistically dierent
from zero at the 10% level. Hence, we can conclude that if Rome was not such a big local area, and had
just a mean value of population, the post-acquisition performance of foreign rms would undoubtedly be
negative, due to the relatively low level of civic capital.
Let us now consider the impact on productivity of an ownership change in the median province in terms
of civic capital among those with some start event (the province is Prato, with a value of CC equal to
.841). In this case, evaluating the marginal eect at the mean level of population, we get a value of -.075.
The F-test reveals that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the linear restriction is zero at the 10%
level. For the province with the highest level of civic capital (Forl-Cesena, with a value of 2.193) we nd a
positive point estimate of the marginal eect of civic capital equal to .025, being not statistically dierent
from zero. Overall, our ndings conrm the following facts. Apart from provinces with a very high level of
civic capital, the point estimate of the eect of foreign ownership on productivity is negative. This negative
sign is statistically dierent from zero at the 1% level in the case of provinces with a relatively low level
35The positive point estimates for the productivity eect of a stop event is not in accordance with the descriptive evidence
of Table 1 and Figure 5: once we control for a series of industry, province, and time eects, the stop event seems to foster
productivity growth, rather than to halt it. This positive estimate is reassuring, because the specication of our econometric
model of equation (3) assumes that the eect of a start event (FO = +1) is the opposite of that of a stop event (FO =  1).
See also footnote 37 on this issue.
36In this manner we are assessing the impact of a start event in provinces that really experienced a foreign acquisition.
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of civic capital (and a relatively small local market size). The main contribution of our paper is to show
that a key determinant of the assimilation costs incurred by foreign rms, and hence their post-acquisition
performance, is the degree of opportunism characterizing the area where the rm is located. Where civic
capital is high, the growth rate of TFP of rms that switch into foreign ownership is not statistically
dierent from rms which do not display any change in ownership. According to our conceptual framework,
in these kind of provinces advantages and disadvantages of foreign ownership compensate each other so
that the net eect on productivity is not signicantly dierent from zero. Where civic capital is low, in
turn, disadvantages due to governance costs are prominent and the performance of rms acquired by foreign
investors is signicantly lower than that of constant ownership rms.
The pattern we have just described is reversed when we consider the switch from foreign into domestic
ownership (stop event). In this case the coecient 3 (measuring the impact of the stop dummy when
civic capital and log population are zero) is positive, while 4 (the coecient of the interaction term with
civic capital) is negative, although the last term is never statistically dierent from zero. The rst thing
to note is that the unconditional estimate of Table 1 (where a stop event was associated to a decrease in
productivity) was quite misleading, since the estimates of the model in equation (4) predict that there is a
positive impact of a stop event in low-civic-capital low-population areas. The second is that these results
may be inuenced by two factors. On the one side, the sign of the point estimates of 3 and 4 may indicate
a large drop in governance costs induced by the stop event. In the case of a stop event, a domestic investor
is replacing a foreign one. We have argued above why it is reasonable to think that domestic owners are less
aected than foreign ones by governance and assimilation costs. The benecial eect of domestic ownership
is particularly strong where civic capital is low and the local market size is small.37 On the other side, we
have to be cautious on the interpretation of these parameters, as the fact that 4 is not statistically dierent
from zero may signal noise in the estimation of the eect of stop (the number of stop events in our data set
is roughly half of that of start events, see Table 1).
6 Discussion and robustness of the analysis
We now further discuss the problem of endogeneity and what is the impact on the estimation results. Then,
we provide some robustness checks to our analysis.
6.1 Further endogeneity concerns
An issue that is worth taking into account is the fact that foreign rms' acquisitions can be concentrated in
some selected areas. If rms of the same type (in terms of some unobserved characteristic) tend to locate
in the same areas this could induce a bias in our estimation. To clarify the issue, we consider the following
case which may arise in our context.
Let us assume that foreign investors take the future governance and assimilation costs induced by the
37The fact that the sign of the estimates of 3 and 4 is the opposite of that of 1 and 2 is reassuring, provided that the
model in equation (3) is obtained from the model in equation (4) if the following linear restrictions are imposed: 1 =  3,
2 =  4, and 5 =  6. If we test these linear restrictions after having estimated equation (4), they are not rejected by an
F-test at the 10% level of statistical signicance.
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ownership change into account when deciding where to invest. Given that civic capital decreases governance
costs, we may have a non-random selection into treatment which introduces an endogeneity bias in our
analysis. In particular, foreign investors who expect for some reason their rms to perform poorly after the
acquisition may seek to go in areas where civic capital is higher, to reduce at least the impact of governance
costs. On the contrary, foreign investors with an idiosyncratically low tendency to post-acquisition problems
may care less about the civic capital of the province where they are investing, and so have a higher chance
of landing up in areas with low civic capital. We take comfort from the fact that this kind of self-selection
tends to bias our estimates downwards. Since we nd that foreign rms in high civic capital areas tend to
perform better than foreign rms in low civic capital areas, the fact that \bad" foreign investors (in terms
of post-acquisition performance) are going in high civic capital areas would cause an underestimation of the
true positive eect of civic capital on the performance dierential.
Another source of endogeneity may descend from the following fact. While the specication in rst
dierences eliminates all sort of unobservables at the rm level that are time constant, we cannot exclude
that foreign investment is based on a certain growth pattern at the individual level. For example, it could
be the case that start events are more frequent in rms experiencing a higher TFP growth rate. In the
robustness analysis we describe how we try to deal with this problem.38
6.2 Robustness of the analysis
In Table 6 we perform some robustness checks. We present the results when we introduce the START and
STOP dummies.39 Columns (1) - (4) show several variations of equation (4). In column (1) we measure
the size of the local market by provincial gross domestic product instead of population.40 There is a tiny
decrease in magnitude but the coecients are still statistically dierent from zero.
In column (2) we control for a wider array of provincial control. We introduce the interaction of the
START and STOP dummies with the log of the share of university graduates at the provincial level, and
with the log of the length of trials in civil aairs. The precision of the estimate of 2 is somehow aected (the
coecient is now signicant at the 10% level only). We explain this fact with the sizeable multicollinearity
among the provincial regressors, which inates the standard errors.
In column (3) we include rm level controls into the productivity regression, such as the growth rate of
total size (in terms of workers), of the capital stock and of the number of skilled workers. The inclusion
of the growth rate of rm-level variables tries to reduce rm-specic unobserved heterogeneity upon which
foreign acquisitions can be based. As an example, we mentioned above the case where start events could
be more frequent in rms experiencing a higher TFP growth. Results show very little sensitivity to the
addition of these variables, so we are somehow reassured by this.
Next, in column (4) we exclude observations located in Milan, the province with the largest number of
starters. Results reveal that they are not driven by this province.
38The straight way to tackle this issue would be to add to the growth equations (3) or (4) a rm-specic term i, and
then to proceed with standard panel data methods. This amounts to adding a term equal to it in equation (2), getting
what is sometimes called a random trend model. We abstain to follow this route provided the low number of rms with two
observations in terms of growth rates (these are the rms which are surveyed in all three waves).
39The results in terms of the FO variable do not show any signicant dierence.
40Similarly to provincial population, we average gross domestic product for each province over the period 1995-2003.
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Finally, in columns (5) we measure rm performance by labor productivity, dened as value added per
worker. Results are robust also to this change in the measurement of the dependent variable.
7 Conclusion
In this article, we empirically show that the eect of foreign ownership on rm performance depends on the
stock of civic capital in the area in which the rm is located. Starting from a model where the productivity
of a rm is assumed to depend on the foreign ownership status, we have turned to a dierence-in-dierences
approach in order to identify the eect of foreign ownership and civic capital on productivity. We have found
that civic capital has a statistically signicant positive eect on the productivity of foreign rms. When we
estimate the eect of start and stop events separately, in the case of rms that cease to be foreign owned
(thus becoming domestic again) we nd an eect which is not statistically dierent from zero. Overall, these
results suggest that civic capital substantially decreases assimilation and governance costs of foreign rms.
The estimation approach took explicitly into account unobserved rm-level heterogeneity, as well as
industry, province, and time trends. Our main measure to quantify rm performance is total factor pro-
ductivity, estimated by the approach suggested by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003).
This study provides an important new insight on the eect of foreign ownership on rm performance.
Rather than assuming that assimilation and governance costs of foreign aliates are constant within a
country, we stress the importance of informal institutions at the local level, and in particular we show that
the level of local civic capital exerts an eect on these costs and ultimately on performance.
We believe that future research on the topic should address the following issues. First of all, our analysis
admittedly provide a short run view on the TFP dynamics. We analyze TFP changes and ownership
changes that occur over a period of three years only (the lapse of time between two consecutive waves). We
cannot exclude that the productivity implications of foreign acquisitions may be dierent when aliates
are observed over a longer period of time. Another important issue that deserves more attention in the
future is to understand whether the nationality of the investor plays a role, in conjunction with civic capital,
in shaping the performance of foreign aliates. Results such as those in Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006)
highlights that the nationality of the investor can make a dierence. Unfortunately, the UniCredit data
set does not allow to retrive the nationality of the foreign investor. This would be an interesting piece of
information, since one could investigate if and how the cultural distance between the investing country and
the recipient country interact with civic capital to inuence the performance of foreign rms.
8 Appendix
8.1 Detailed description of the data set
8.1.1 Firm-level variables
Value added : Value added, deated by 2-digit NACE producers' price indices obtained from Istat tables.
Base year is 2000. Source: AIDA.
Capital stock : Fixed assets, deated through an average of the 2-digit price indices employed for value
added. Base year is 2000. Source: AIDA.
Skilled workforce: Skilled workers include entrepreneurs, executives and white collars. Source: UniCredit
Survey.
Unskilled workforce: Unskilled workers include blue collars. Source: UniCredit Survey.
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Here we report the question A7 from the UniCredit Survey regarding the ownership structure.
A7. State, in a descending order in terms of voting securities owned, the characteristics of persons that
own and/or directly control the enterprise.
Persons Type of person Share of voting Does the person Does the person
(keep anonymous) (see Note) securities held exert a direct control have voting deals
by the person on the rm? with others?
A7.1 Person a 1 2 3 4 5 % 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
A7.2 Person b 1 2 3 4 5 % 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
A7.3 Person c 1 2 3 4 5 % 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
A7.4 Others %
Total 100%
Note: Indicate as follows: 1) Person non resident in Italy; 2) Physical person resident in Italy; 3) Italian business
enterprise operating in manufacturing; 4) Italian business enterprise operating in services; 5) Italian banks and other
Italian nancial institutions.
8.1.2 Trimming procedure
Observations which display an extreme growth rate in value added, capital stock, number of blue collars,
or number of white collars are excluded from the regression. A growth rate is considered as extreme if it
belongs to the upper (99.5%) or lower (0.5%) tail of the distribution of growth rates. Growth rates are
calculated for each couple of subsequent years within the period 1995-2003.
8.1.3 Measures of civic capital
Blood donations: The number of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants, disaggregated by province. The
data are collected from the health authorities of Italian regions. In each region, regional health authorities
collect data on blood donations and subsequently send this information to the Superior Institute of Health
(Istituto Superiore di Sanita) which, in turn, maintains a National and Regional Registry of Blood and
Plasma. Provincial data on blood donations are not available for Apulia and Lazio. For the provinces of
these two regions we take the total regional value. Data refer to the year 2002 and the source is Cartocci
(2007) on data from the Superior Institute of Health.
Volunteers: It is the number of volunteers in non-prot organizations per 100,000 inhabitants. Data
refer to the year 2000 and the source is de Blasio & Nuzzo (2010).
Referenda turnout : It is the average provincial electoral turnout for the referenda on the choice between
republic and monarchy (1946), divorce (1974), public nancing of political parties (1978), public security
and anti-terrorism measures (1981), abortion (1981), wage escalator regulations (1985) and nuclear power
and hunting regulations (1987). The following eight provinces were created after 1995: Biella, Lecco,
Lodi, Rimini, Prato, Crotone, Vibo Valentia, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola. The provinces to which they belonged
before 1995 and whose value has been assigned to them appear in parenthesis: Biella (Vercelli), Lecco (simple
average of Bergamo and Como), Lodi (Milan), Rimini (Forl-Cesena), Prato (Firenze), Crotone (Catanzaro),
Vibo Valentia (Catanzaro), Verbano-Cusio-Ossola (Novara). The source of data for referendum turnout is
the Ministry of the Interior.
8.1.4 Other provincial covariates
Population: Total population per province expressed in thousands of inhabitants, averaged over the period
1995-2003. Source: Istat.
GDP: Provincial value added expressed in millions of Euro, averaged over the period 1995-2003. Source:
Istat.
Length of trials: It is the number of days it takes to complete a rst degree trial in civil aairs in each of
the 165 Italian labor courts. The data are averaged over the years 1995-2003 and are provided by Istat in
the data base Territorial Information System on Justice (Sistema Informativo Territoriale sulla Giustizia).
Since there are more courts than provinces and since in some cases the territory of a court belongs to two
dierent provinces we proceed as follows. First, we assign to each city of the province the value of the court
to which the city belongs. This information is then averaged for all the cities belonging to the same province
to get a provincial variable.
University graduates: It is the number of university graduates per province, divided by total provincial
population. The data refer to the 2001 Census of the population and are from Istat.
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8.2 Derivation of the rst principal component
The intuition of principal component analysis (PCA) in our context is the following: given the three proxies
of civic capital, each province corresponds to a point in a three dimensional vector space. The idea of PCA
is to nd a linear combination of the three variables which re-expresses the original data set in such a way
that it captures most of the common variance. This linear combination corresponds to the rst principal
component.
In general terms, the rst principal component can be derived as follows (see Jollie, 2002): vector x
denominates the data consisting of p random variables (the three proxies of civic capital in our case) and
vector 1 consists of p constants, 11; 12; : : : 1p. Consider the linear function 
0
1x:
01x = 11x1 + 12x2 + : : :+ 1pxp =
pX
j=1
1jxj (5)
Finding the rst principal component amounts to determine the elements of 1 which maximize the
variance of V ar[01x] = 
0
1S1, where S is the covariance matrix of x. The vector 1 is constrained to have
unit length, which implies that 011 = 1. The corresponding Lagrange maximization function takes the
following form:
01S1   (011   1): (6)
Maximizing (6) with respect to 1 gives
(S  Ip)1 = 0; (7)
in which the Lagrange multiplier  is the eigenvalue of S and the corresponding eigenvector is 1. Ip is
the p-dimensional identity matrix. Because the quantity to be maximized is 01S1 = 
0
11 = , the
eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue is chosen. The rst principal component is then 01x. In our data,
the highest eigenvalue takes the value of 2.48. The associated eigenvector explains 75% of the total variance.
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Figure 1: Map of electoral turnout in referenda, averaged over 7 referenda that took place between 1946
and 1987.
Figure 2: Map of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants.
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Figure 3: Map of the number of volunteers in non-prot organizations per 100,000 inhabitants.
Figure 4: Map of civic capital measured by the rst principal component of blood donations, volunteering,
and electoral turnout.
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Figure 5: This graph plots the distribution of TFP before (light gray) and after (dark gray) a start or a
stop event, for low civic capital provinces and high civic capital provinces respectively. The dots outside
the boxes are outliers.
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Table 1: Firm performance and ownership structure
START event STOP event Always Always
Before After Variation Before After Variation Domestic Foreign
Value added per worker (log) 4.301 3.889 -.411 4.021 3.866 -.155 3.684 3.897
Capital stock (log) 8.256 7.990 -.265 8.023 7.990 -.033 6.981 9.135
Workers (log) 4.162 4.210 .048 4.291 4.252 -.039 3.596 4.936
Total Factor Prod. (log) 5.071 4.704 -.367 4.778 4.710 -.067 4.387 4.961
Obs. 74 74 74 41 41 41 1836 16
Note: The table shows the performance of the rms according to dierent types of ownership structure. First of all, we
describe some rm-level variables before and after the two events that characterize the change in ownership (starting to
be foreign owned and stopping to be foreign owned). The variation is measured over periods of three years (1997-2000 or
2000-2003). The last two columns summarize data for rms which are always domestically owned and rms which are al-
ways foreign owned over the entire period. The dierent performance measures are: Value added per worker is the log of
value added divided by the total number of workers employed by the rm; Capital stock is equal to xed assets; Workers is
the total number of employees; Total Factor Productivity is a residual term whose computation follows Levinsohn & Petrin
(2003).
Table 2: Correlation among the proxies of civic capital
Referenda turnout (log) Volunteers (log) Blood donations (log)
Volunteers (log) 0.69 1
Blood donations (log) 0.61 0.57 1
Principal component 0.89 0.87 0.84
Note: The number of observations is 103. Blood donations is the log of the number of blood dona-
tions per 1000 inhabitants inn 2002; Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-prot
institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Referenda turnout is the log of the average electoral
turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; Principal component is the the rst principal compo-
nent of the above mentioned three proxies of civic capital. All correlations are statistically dierent
from zero at the 1% level.
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Table 4: TFP dynamics and ownership change: FO variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No interactions Turnout Blood Volunteers Principal comp.
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
FO -0.029 -5.329*** -1.422*** -1.943*** -0.772***
(0.034) (1.655) (0.351) (0.631) (0.220)
FO  lnTurnout 1.046***
(0.377)
FO  lnBlood 0.210**
(0.094)
FO  lnV olunteers 0.137**
(0.061)
FO  Principal comp. 0.072**
(0.028)
FO  lnPopulation 0.100*** 0.091*** 0.107*** 0.104***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.037) (0.034)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.352 0.356 0.355 0.355 0.356
Obs. 1989 1989 1989 1989 1989
Note: The table presents the results of OLS estimates. Fixed eects for each 2-digit industry, each province,
and each time period are included. The dependent variable is the change in log TFP, !ijst. FO captures
changes in ownership and takes the following values: FO = +1 if a rm becomes foreign; FO =  1 if a
rm becomes domestically owned; FO = 0 if a foreign does not change ownership status (it stays domes-
tically or foreign owned). We use the following variables to measure civic capital: ln Turnout is the log of
the average electoral turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; ln Blood is the log of the number of blood
donations per 1000 inhabitants in 2002; ln Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-prot
institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; CC is the rst principal component of the above mentioned
three proxies of civic capital. We also include as a control lnPopulation, which is the log of provincial pop-
ulation averaged over the period 1995-2003. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, in order
to allow for correlation between observations located in the same province. ***,**,* denote signicance at
the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
28
Table 5: TFP dynamics and ownership change with civic capital interactions: START and STOP
dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No interactions Turnout Blood Volunteers Principal comp.
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
START -0.008 -6.084*** -1.595*** -1.618** -0.759**
(0.039) (1.646) (0.505) (0.674) (0.303)
START lnTurnout 1.223***
(0.369)
START lnBlood 0.256*
(0.133)
START lnV olunteers 0.104
(0.065)
START lnPrincipal comp. 0.075***
(0.027)
STOP 0.064 3.750 1.075* 2.453* 0.761***
(0.063) (3.220) (0.613) (1.324) (0.293)
STOP lnTurnout -0.692
(0.732)
STOP lnBlood -0.126
(0.178)
STOP lnV olunteers -0.191
(0.146)
STOP lnPrincipal comp. -0.064
(0.064)
START lnPopulation 0.098** 0.093** 0.103** 0.103**
(0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044)
STOP lnPopulation -0.095** -0.083* -0.111** -0.100**
(0.048) (0.047) (0.051) (0.046)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.352 0.356 0.355 0.355 0.356
Obs. 1989 1989 1989 1989 1989
Note: The table presents the results of OLS estimates. Fixed eects for each 2-digit industry, each province,
and each time period are included. The dependent variable is the change in log TFP, !ijst. START is a
dummy variable which equals one if a rm becomes foreign owned. STOP is a dummy variable which equals
one if a rm becomes domestically owned. We use the following variables to measure civic capital: ln Turnout is
the log of the average electoral turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; ln Blood is the log of the number of
blood donations per 1000 inhabitants in 2002; ln Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-prot
institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Principal comp. is the rst principal component of the above men-
tioned three proxies of civic capital. We also include as a control lnPopulation, which is the log of provincial
population averaged over the period 1995-2003. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, in order to
allow for correlation between observations located in the same province. ***,**,* denote signicance at the 1%,
5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP Provincial cov. Firm cov. No Milan Value added
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
START -0.948** -0.114 -0.881*** -1.006** -0.758***
(0.401) (1.836) (0.323) (0.391) (0.279)
STARTPrincipal comp. 0.060** 0.060* 0.075*** 0.085*** 0.070***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
STOP 0.991*** 0.113 0.694*** 0.972** 0.845***
(0.378) (2.997) (0.266) (0.413) (0.287)
STOPPrincipal comp. -0.048 -0.041 -0.071 -0.074 -0.023
(0.066) (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) (0.036)
START lnGDP 0.092**
(0.041)
STOP lnGDP -0.094**
(0.041)
START lnPopulation 0.077* 0.123** 0.142** 0.110***
(0.041) (0.048) (0.059) (0.041)
STOP lnPopulation -0.061 -0.086** -0.134** -0.119***
(0.075) (0.041) (0.067) (0.040)
START  lnUniversity graduates 0.116
(0.218)
STOP  lnUniversity graduates -0.220
(0.250)
START  lnLength of trials -0.098
(0.209)
STOP  lnLength of trials 0.113
(0.392)
 lnWorkers 0.054
(0.040)
 lnCapital -0.126***
(0.016)
 lnSkilled -0.111***
(0.032)
R2 0.356 0.356 0.390 0.362 0.492
Obs. 1989 1989 1989 1805 1995
Note: The table presents the results of OLS estimates. Fixed eects for each 2-digit industry, each province,
and each time period are included. The dependent variable is !ijst in columns (1) - (4). In the last column,
the dependent variable is  lnV AWijst, where VAW stands for value added per worker. START is a dummy
variable which equals one if a rm becomes foreign owned. STOP is a dummy variable which equals one if
a rm becomes domestically owned. Civic capital is measured by Principal comp., which is the rst principal
component of the three direct proxies of civic capital. The included provincial controls are: lnGDP is the log
of provincial gross domestic product averaged over the period 1995-2003; lnPopulation is the log of provincial
population averaged over the period 1995-2003; lnLength of trials is the provincial log of the length, expressed
in days, to complete a rst degree trial averaged over the period 1995-2003. lnUniversity graduates is the log
of the share of provincial population holding a university degree in 2001. The included rm-level controls are:
 lnWorkers is the log of the change in the total number of employees;  lnCapital is the log of change in the
capital stock of the rm;  lnSkilled is the log of the change of skilled workers. Standard errors are clustered
at the provincial level, in order to allow for correlation between observations located in the same province. ***,
**, * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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